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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY
PARASOMNIA ACTIVITY

Tennessee v. Scott, 275 S.W. 3d 395 (Tenn. 2009).
Rashida Davis'
I.

Summary

Due to the lack of uniformity among trial courts, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee granted an interlocutory
appeal in Tennessee v. Scott to resolve a dispute regarding
the admission of expert witness testimony. 2 Traditionally,
trial courts used a broad theme of "relevance and
reliability" when considering expert testimony. 3 The Court
replaced that general theme with a four-prong test that
included a "qualifications assessment, analytical cohesion,4
methodological reliability, and fundamental reliability.",
The Court ruled that the trial court erred in excluding the
expert witness testimony without this analysis. 5
II.

Background

The defendant, Leroy Scott, was charged with three
counts of sexual battery and two counts of rape of his
stepdaughter, who was a minor. 6 He appealed from the
1J.D., pending 2012, Univ. of Tennessee; B.A., Political Science,
Georgia State Univ. Prior to attending law school, Ms. Davis worked
as a flight attendant.
2 State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2009).
3 id.
4 id.

5 Id. at 402.
6

id.

1
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decision of the trial court to exclude his expert witness
testimony, which would have explained his behavior. The
trial court held that the expert's "methodology and
principles underlying the scientific evidence [were] not
sufficiently trustworthy and reliable to be presented to the
trier of fact." 7 Mr. Scott contended that he was unaware of
what he was doing because he was asleep, and his8 expert
witness was a crucial part of explaining this theory.
Mr. Scott's expert witness, Dr. J. Brevard Haynes,
diagnosed Mr. Scott with "sleep parasomnia with sexual
Sleep parasomnia is a clinical disorder
behavior." 9
involving arousal during sleep. 10 When Mr. Scott notified
the State of this defense, the State moved to exclude the
expert testimony." I The trial court granted the State's
motion, and the resulting appeal ensued. 12
III.

Court's Conclusions and Rationale

The Tennessee Supreme Court identified the
important role that trial courts play as "gatekeepers when ' it3
comes to admissibility of expert witness testimony."'
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 states:
"[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
7
8
9

Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 400.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 406.

10

THE INTERNATIONAL

CLASSIFICATION

DIAGNOSTIC & CODING MANUAL
" Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 399.

OF

SLEEP DISORDERS:

(2d ed. 2005).

12 Id.

State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 300-301 (Tenn. 2007); Johnson
v. John Hancock Funds, 217 S.W.3d 414, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
13

2
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
Trial courts must ensure that the "opinions are based on
relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and not
upon an expert's mere speculation."' 4 When the trial court
excluded Dr. Haynes's expert testimony without any
explanation, the Court criticized the trial court for its lack
of "appropriate inquiry" and conclusory ruling.' 5 The
Court created a template for trial courts to follow when
"a
deciding whether to admit expert testimony:
cohesion,
assessment,
analytical
qualifications
6
methodological reliability, and fundamental reliability."'
With regard to the qualifications assessment, an
expert witness must have specialized knowledge, skill, and
experience that provide the jury with an informed
decision.' 7 In this instance, Dr. Haynes was a graduate of
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. 8 He was board9
certified in internal, pulmonary, and sleep medicine.'
Doctor Haynes testified that he spent twenty years studying
sleep medicine. He was an Assistant Clinical Professor at
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine and the Director
20
of the Saint Thomas Health Services Center for Sleep.
If the expert is qualified, then the court must
evaluate the analytical cohesion of the expert testimony.
To admit the evidence, the court must find that the expert's
research supports his or her conclusion. 2 1 If there is an
14

McDaniel v. CSX Transp. Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997).

'5
16

Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 399.

Id. at 402.
Id.
8 Id. at 405.

17

'9 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 405.
20

Id.

21 1_1

3
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"analytical gap" between the research and the opinion, the
court may exclude the expert. 22 In this case, Dr. Haynes
diagnosed Mr. Scott with sleep parasomnia with sexual
Doctor Haynes concluded that Mr. Scott's
activity.
him to "inappropriate[ly] touch [his] step
disorder caused
23
daughter."
Doctor Haynes's opinion was based on the physical
examination, multiple sleep latency test, medical literature,
and interview with Mr. Scott, who had a history of "night
terrors and sleep walking., 24 Mr. Scott's wife claimed that
he touched her sexually while he was asleep. 25 Also, his
behavior was similar to others diagnosed with sleep
parasomnia with sexual activity.26
Trial courts next must evaluate the methodological
reliability of the expert, which
• 2 7 explores the expert's method
For example, Dr. Haynes
for obtaining information.
primarily relied on Mr. Scott's statements as a basis for his
opinion. Doctor Haynes testified that this method of "selfreporting" was "consistent with accepted practices utilized
by physicians and psychologists. 28
Trial courts also must consider foundational
reliability, which "assess[es] the expert's field or discipline
... the reliability of the field.. . and the underlying facts
29
upon which the expert's opinion is predicated.,
Foundational and methodological reliability share some
overlapping concepts; however, the key difference is that

22

Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 402; State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 834-835

(Tenn.2002).
23 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 405.
24

Id.

25 Id.
26

Id. at 406.

27
28

Id. at 407.

29

Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 406.
Id. at 407.

4

6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 329
deals with the expert's area of
foundational reliability
30
expertise as a whole.
Doctor Haynes "provided the trial court with a 2007
article that provide[d] analysis of the literature related to
sexual behavior as a sleep parasomnia." 31 He "relied
upon...peer-reviewed" literature "having been assessed by
experts in the field." 32 Literature that was not "sufficiently
Based
supported... [was] rejected for publication." 33
on the Court's prescribed rules of the qualifications
assessment, analytical cohesion, methodological reliability,
and foundational reliability, the Court held that Dr.
Haynes's testimony should have been admitted.34 Doctor
Haynes was a qualified medical expert who used valid
methods and sound medical theory to form his
conclusion. 35 He used valid methods to obtain the data for
parasomnia is a recognized
his conclusion. 36 Lastly, sleep
37
psychology.
of
area
and valid
IV.

Analysis

Although the traditional rule of "relevance and
reliability 38 is too broad, the Court's four-prong test of "a
cohesion,
analytical
qualifications
assessment,
methodological reliability, and fundamental reliability" is
too narrow. To understand the implications of this change,
30
31

Id.
id.

32 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 407; see generally Carlos H. Schenck, Isabelle

Arnulf, Mark W. Mahowald, Sleep and Sex: What Can Go Wrong? A
Review of the Literature on Sleep Related Disorders and Abnormal
Sexual Behaviors and Experiences, 683 SLEEP (June 1, 2007).
33 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 407.
14 Id. at411.

35 Id. at 405.
36

Id. at 407.

37

Id.
38 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 401.
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one must consider what types of experts would not fit this
regimen. The four-prong test is likely best for experts in
academia, as in the case of Tennessee v. Scott, but problems
may arise when the individual's expertise cannot be
quantified or measured, for example, experts in "drug
jargon ' 39 or drug culture. n
The rigid application of rules might prevent the very
goal the Court seeks to attain, which is the inclusion of
testimony for qualified experts. Perhaps "[n]o framework
exists that provides for simple and practical application in
every case; the complexity and diversity of potential
scientific evidence is simply too vast for the application of
a simple test."4 1 Ideally, the evidentiary analysis should
retain a structured system for considering expert testimony
while still allowing room for flexibility.
The rules regarding the inclusion of expert
testimony should encompass uniformity, the requirement of
a credible witness and field, and only limited restriction on
the trial court's discretion. The Tennessee Supreme Court
makes an interesting point that "expert testimony need not
establish that the expert testimony is correct, only that it
rests upon good grounds.' 42 This theme of "good grounds"
Tennesee v. Elliot, No. M2008-02686-CCA-R3-CD, 2010
WL1425452, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2010) (affirming the trial
court's admission of a police officer as an expert witness on drug
jargon).
40 Tennessee v. Rodriguez, No. M2005-00951-CCA-R3-CD, 2006
WL2310666, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2006) (affirming the
trial court's decision not to admit a police officer as expert witness on
drug culture).
39

41

McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d

at 265 (Birch,

J., concurring);

see

Developments in the Law - Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1513-1516 (1995).
42
Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 404; Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R.

Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (Ist Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see also In re
Paoli R. R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3rd Cir. 1994); Burley

6
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should be the overarching context to which expert witness
testimony should be included.43 The method for ensuring
that indeed an expert does possess this quality is through
the adversarial system.44 Even the Court acknowledges
that expert testimony "should be tested by the adversary
process-competing expert testimony and active crossfrom juror's
than
excluded
examination-rather
45
scrutiny.
V.

Conclusion

By creating a formulaic guideline for expert
testimony, the Court stepped away from the traditional
The
approach and created a new uniform system.
traditional rules regarding expert testimony relied upon the
These
vague principles of relevance and reliability.
principles allowed trial courts to exclude testimony
arbitrarily. The Court responded by restricting trial courts'
discretion. Now, trial courts must follow the prescribed
analysis for determining the admission of expert witness
testimony. The prescribed rules will ultimately lead to a
more uniform approach to the decisional process of trial
courts; however, the rules leave little room for discretion.
A more flexible approach to the admission of expert
testimony would allow the adversarial system to do the
work. The adversarial system allows opposing parties to
proffer reasons why the expert witness should or should not
be admitted and even cross-examine the expert witness.
Allowing opposing counsel to make a case for or against an
expert will preserve judicial discretion and will provide
flexibility for the admission of expert testimony. The
v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip. Inc., 737 N.W.2d 397, 406 (S.D.
2007).
"
44
45

Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 404.
id.
Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 85.

7
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zealous representation by counsel is the most appropriate
mechanism that the court system has to offer for the
admission of a qualified expert witness.

8
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